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Abstract 
This study aims at testing the relation between intelligence and governance. It is based on 
African data. This study finds that countries with high-IQ populations enjoy good 
governance. 
Keys-word : institution, governance, intelligence, Africa 
JEL Classification: D73, I2 
INTRODUCTION 
In spite of some grey areas (e.g. Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006; Méon and 
Weill, 2010; Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2008; Arndt, 2009), economists now 
generally admit that institutions or governance matter for the performance of a 
nation, especially from an economic point of view (e.ge. Acemoglu, Johnson et  
Robinson,  2005 ; Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et Shleifer, 2003 
; Davis, Owen et Videras, 2009 ; Baland, Moene et Robinson, J., 2010). However 
this consensus collapses once one tries to include/understand the impulses or the 
determinants of institutions or gouvernance. Moreover, the ad hoc literature is 
still in development (e.g. North, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; North, 
Wallis and Weingast, 2010; Baland, Moene and Robinson, 2010).   
This article is precisely in line with this research program. It raises the 
following question: does intelligence explain the level of governance of a State? 
Let us recall quickly that recently the issue of intelligence started to draw the 
attention of economists. Work of Jones and Schneider (2006), Weede and Kämpf 
(2002) and Jones (2011) empirically assign a positive effect of intelligence on 
growth. Potrafke (2012) thinks of a negative effect of intelligence on corruption. 
It is also studied within the framework of game theory (Jones, 2008; Jones and 
Podemska 2010). One realizes quickly that much is left to study. This study 
contributes its share to the research, by thus marrying the need to 
include/understand the determinants of governance to the recent research by 
economists on the effects of intelligence. 
While thinking of the concern of this article, one would be first tempted to 
think of a truism. That would be wrong. Intelligence being “the very general 
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mental capacity which implies in particular the ability to reason, to plan, to solve 
problems, to think abstractedly, to correctly understand complex ideas, to learn 
quickly and to benefit from one’s experiments.” (Gottfredson, 1997; Larivée and 
Gagné, 2006), it is almost natural to deduce that the level of intelligence 
influences the governance of a nation, but the expected sign is not possible to 
determine a priori nor is the direction of the effect (direct or indirect). One cannot 
determine ex ante the effect of intelligence. If intelligence can be useful for the 
good, it can also be used to circumvent rules or to seek rents, which for example 
contributes to strengthen atypical or counterproductive regimes. Africa is 
precisely populated with anecdotes of this kind. 
Because Africa is a backward continent, it remains a candidate for the 
Gerschenkron effect (Gerschenkron, 1962): the effect to be able to benefit from 
the experiments of the others in order to take off (even in terms of governance). 
Theories of endogenous growth (imitation/transfer of technology or innovation) 
also agree with this. And here, it is in particular the level of intelligence which is 
requested. 
Indeed, if the highest aberrant values in the distribution of intelligence are 
used advisedly in a society, it is very likely to benefit from a good elite both at 
the level of State management as in civil society. This can only encourage good 
governance and make society benefit from the Gerschenkron effect or of the 
advantages of imitation and innovation predicted in theories of endogenous 
growth (Aghion and Howitt, 2009), and, in fine, generate a virtuous circle. The 
reversed effect is also not to be completely excluded. But if the standard 
deviation of this distribution is close to zero, the effect of intelligence depends 
then on the absolute level of intelligence. If all the population enjoys higher 
intelligence, it is likely that political equilibrium will be optimal, with a positive 
consequence on governance. Under the assumption that the level of intelligence 
is lower, social equilibrium is very low with, consequently, a probable “capture” 
of society by the dominant coalition. 
The object of this study is, as we underlined it, to study the relation between 
governance and intelligence on the basis of African data. Interest for Africa is 
justified initially by the African specificity which has always been . Then and 
finally, the second reason is due to the originality of data on governance. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The following section is 
concerned with the presentation of the data and the strategy of econometric 
estimate. Then we present the results. Lastly, a conclusion is suggested. 
 
 
DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
From the econometric point of view, we borrow the approach of Potrafke 
(2012). The equation to be estimated is as follows: 
 
With I = 4… N and m representing the various listed African countries.It is about 
Angola (AGO), Benin (BEN), Botswana (BWA), Burkina Faso (BFA), Burundi 
(BDI), Cameroon (CMR), Central African Republic (CIF), Chad (TCD), DRC 
(ZAR), Côte d'Ivoire (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ethiopia (ETH), Ghana (GHA), 
Guinea-Bissau (GNB), Kenya (KEN), Lesotho (LSO), Madagascar (MDG), 
Malawi (MWI), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Maurice (DRIVEN), Morocco 
(MAR), Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Niger (NER), Rwanda (RWA), 
Senegal (SEN), Sierra Leone (SLE), South Africa (ZAF), Togo (TGO), Tunisia 
(TUN), Uganda (UGA), Tanzania (TZA), Zambia (ZMB) and Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
Gov is a proxy of Governance. We exploit the data of the Ibrahim 
Foundation. This indicator compiles 86 indicators gathered in 14 subcategories 
and four categories (secuirty and rule of law, participation and human right, 
sustainable economic development and human development) which evaluate the 
effective service of goods and public services delivered to African citizens. The 
Ibrahim Index constitutes the most complete collection of quantitative 
information leading to an annual evaluation of the performance with regard to 
governance in each African country, only. This index is financed and controlled 
by a African institution. It is not exploited yet in the empirical literature. In 
addition, in our estimates, Gov2010 relates to the level of the governance in 2010 
and Gov2005 on the level of the governance in 2005. 
IQ relates to the mean intelligence quotient of the general population. 
Gouillon (2002) affirms that IQ is the tool more used in psychometry. It allows in 
form simple to quantify a great number of cognitive capacities of the subject and 
her general intelligence (the factor G). Psychologists regularly resort to it 
(Neisser, 1998; Larivée and Gagné, 2006). We make use of it to approximate 
intelligence. In the estimates, QI2006 relates to the level of intelligence in 2006 
and QI2002 on the level of the intelligence in 2002. 
The data on IQ come from Lynn et al. (2002, 2006 and 2010). In Table 1, 
i.e. basic estimates, we employ the data of Lynn and Vanhanen (2006), which 
was also used by Jones and Schneider (2010), Potrafke (2012). The data of Lynn 
and Vanhanen (2002) are employed in the section of tests of robustness. Let us 
specify here that the concern first was to also use the data of Lynn and 
Meisenberg (2010). However, this data base does not cover enough countries of 
our sample. Moreover, this way of testing the robustness of results is used in 
particular by Potrafke (2012).  
Reg is a regional dummy variable. It takes the value 1 if the country belongs 
to the area, and 0 if not. We distinguish five sub-regions : Central Africa, East 
Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa and North Africa. This variable makes it 
possible to control the variation of governance from a sub-region to another. 
X is a vector of control variables, including the log of GDP per capita (Penn 
World Tables 6.3), a dummy of the democracy-dictatorship of Cheibub et al. 
(2010) (Demo). We also control economic globalization by the KOF index used 
by Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008), expressed by GEKOF in the 
econometric results. 
Lastly, OrigDroit variable is taken in La Porta et al. (1999). We distinguish 
two for Africa from them from our sample: the English origin of law 
(OrigDroitAng) on the one hand and the French origin of law (OrigDroitFr) on 
the other. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Before moving to estimates, let us seize initially the statistical 
characteristics of our variables. Table 1 following takes care some. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Variables Obs. Mean Std-dev. Min Max 
Central Africa 35 0,085 0,284 0 1 
Southern Africa 35 0,343 0,482 0 1 
East Africa 35 0,171 0,382 0 1 
North Africa 35 0,114 0,323 0 1 
West Africa 35 0,286 0,458 0 1 
Log GDP per capita 35 7,560 0,883 5,903 9,817 
Demo 35 0,343 0,483 0 1 
GEKOF 35 48,490 10,599 30,384 67,185 
QI2006 35 70,719 6,219 64 89 
QI2002 35 71,286 5,644 63 85 
Gov2010 35 52,244 12,649 30,561 82,465 
Gov2005 35 50,905 13,100 28,120 77,933 
OrigDroitAng 35 0,343 0,486 0 1 
OrigDroitFr 35 0,657 0,486 0 1 
By considering only the variable to be estimated and the variable of interest 
(intelligence), Mauritius appears as the African country which is distinguished 
very positively in terms from governance and of intelligence. And one notes a 
positive change from 77 to 82 out of 100, between 2005 and 2010. However, the 
last rank changes in time. In 2005, DRC occupies the last rank with a note of 28 
out of 100. But in 2010, this position is occupied by Chad. Guinea-Bissau and 
Ethiopia have the weakest IQ in 2002, but in 2006 the place of the last is shared 
by four States: Cameroon, RCA, Mozambique and Sierra-Leone.  
Graph 1 presents the correlation between the variable of interest (IQ) and 
the level of governance in Africa. Whatever the variable considered, one notes 
the existence of “clubs of convergence”.  
Graph 1.IQ and gouvernance  
 
RESULTS 
Basic results  
Table 2 hereafter shows the first five basic estimates. Except for (1), in the 
other columns, the absence of estimated coefficients of certain variables is due to 
the multicolinearity which these variables cause in the estimates. The majority of 
variables of control are not statistically significant. The increase in income tends 
to make level of governance increase, given the high significativity and the 
importance of its coefficient. According to (5), on average, countries of West and 
East Africa have a level of governance higher than countries of central Africa, 
whereas the performances of countries of North and Southern Africa do not 
differ much. Curiously, legal origin does not seem to have significant effect from 
the statistical point of view. In an undifferentiated way, this conclusion applies to 
OrigDroitFr and OrigDroitAng. 
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The level of intelligence statistically influences governance. In columns (1) 
and (3), the degree of confidence is 99%; it drops however to 95% in the other 
columns. This result is considerable insofar as an increase in one percentage 
point in the degree of confidence, compared to its standard deviation, directly 
involves an increase of 4,35 points in the level of governance. The fundamental 
question for which it is necessary to find an answer is: can one affirm that this 
conclusion is robust? 
Table 2. Results of the estimates  
 Gov2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
QI2006 1,02*** 
(0,29) 
1,02** 
(0,45) 
1,35*** 
(0,40) 
0,62** 
(0,30) 
0,70** 
(0,28) 
Central Africa  -9,07 
(7,61) 
 -6,35 
(7,51) 
 
East Africa  5,53 
(5,52) 
 9,35 
(6,62) 
15,78** 
(6,09) 
North Africa   -10,45 
(5,59) 
 5,94 
(7,44) 
Southern Africa  11,13 
(6,82) 
 5,88 
(4,15) 
12,94 
(6,98) 
West Africa  6,43 
(6,94) 
 9,08 
(4,14) 
16,83*** 
(6,15) 
Log GDP per capita    8,00*** 
(2,25) 
8,01*** 
(2,22) 
Demo    2,12 
(4,96) 
 
GEKOF    -0,00 
(0,30) 
0,06 
(0,24) 
OrigDroitFr    -6,49 
(4,64) 
-6,86 
(4,41) 
Constant -20,03 
(20,41) 
-25,64 
(36,54) 
-41,96 
(27,64) 
-54,51 
(26,00) 
-63,64*** 
(22,57) 
Obs. 35 35 35 34 34 
Adj. R² 0,25 0,37 0,25 0,50 0,52 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
Robustness checks 
Given the limited options to validate these results in terms of robustness, we 
resort to the same exercise of robustness used by Potrafke (2012). It is a question 
of changing the years for the variable of control as well as for the variable to be 
estimated. To have the same result suggests that this one remains insensitive with 
change in specification or variation of time. The results of this gymnastics are 
included in table 2. But beyond this way of testing robustness of results, we tried 
to introduce other variables of control: means of instruction age, opening of Penn 
World Tables 6.3 in place of GEKOF. We also used the corrected IQ of Potrafke 
to take into account criticisms of Wicherts et al. (2010). In spite of this change2, 
the conclusion remains the same: intelligence statistically affects governance, in 
a positive way.    
Table 2. Search for robustness  
 Gov2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
QI2002 1,18*** 
(0,29) 
1,37*** 
(0,48) 
1,59*** 
(0,39) 
1,06* 
(0,53) 
1,13** 
(0,47) 
Central Africa  -9,66 
(6,67) 
 -17,44** 
(4,95) 
-19,12** 
(7,55) 
East Africa  8,70 
(5,92) 
 2,17 
(7,45) 
-1,42 
(5,39) 
North Africa    -11,25 
(5,50) 
-9,92 
(10,16) 
-14,16 
(8,73) 
Southern Africa  11,75 
(5,19) 
 -2,18 
(6,72) 
-4,03 
(5,55) 
West Africa  10,22 
(8,21) 
  
 
6,15) 
Log GDP per capita    6,54** 
(2,87) 
6,95 
(3,01) 
Demo    4,90 
(4,85) 
 
GEKOF    0,03 
(0,38) 
-0,08 
(0,22) 
OrigDroitAng    4,44 
(5,37) 
5,22 
(3,99) 
Constant -33,17 
(21,12) 
-53,46 
(39,03) 
-61,40 
(27,11) 
-74,56 
(32,98) 
-74,60** 
(33,07) 
Obs. 35 35 35 34 34 
Adj. R² 0,25 0,37 0,25 0,45 0,45 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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CONCLUSION  
We argue in this article that the level of intelligence of a population is likely 
to affect the governance of government in which this population lives. Indeed, 
because to be intelligent implies "the ability to reason, to solve problems, to 
understand complex ideas well, to learn quickly and to benefit from one’s 
experiments", one can insinuate a nonreversible influence of this one on the 
governance. 
Our econometric analysis made it possible to establish, while controlling for 
the impact of the average income and other traditional variables, a direct relation 
between intelligence and governance: to have a high level of intelligence 
guarantees a remarkable governance in our sample guarantees. This effect proved 
to be of an non negligible extent, since while increasing by one point compared 
to its standard deviation, intelligence is likely to directly involve an increase of 
4,35 points of the level of the governance. Moreover, this relation seems robust. 
These results, in conformity with our assumptions, must however be 
regarded as exploratory. The analysis appears to us to have to be prolonged in 
several directions, in particular the following ones. How does intelligence 
interact with other variables potentially likely to affect governance? Can one 
affirm with robustness the indirect effect of intelligence on governance? Does the 
level of intelligence of the leaders have a direct incidence on governance? Does 
intelligence boost the civil society and its capacity of empowerment? The 
econometric model could be specified so as to test the threshold effects and other 
nonlinearities:  there a minimum level of intelligence from which the effects have 
an importance on governance? Remainder, how does this relation behave if the 
sample is widened, by breaking up governance into several dimensions? 
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